Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, et al. v. Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining and Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining, Alton coal Development, LLC, and Kane
County, Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mike Johnson; Steven F. Alder, Frederic J. Donaldson, Emily Lewis; attorney general\'s office;
attorney for appellee.
Denise A. Dragoo, Alan Sullivan, James P. Allen; Snell & Wilmer; Bennett E. Bayer; Landsrum &
Shouse; attorneys for appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah Chapter of the Sierra v. Utah Division of Oil, No. 20100969 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2635

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB,
et al.,
Petitioners-Appellants,

;
]
]

v.

]
I
]
;
]i
)

Appeal No. 20100969-SC

DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING and
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
Respondents-Appellees, and
ALTON COAL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and
KANE COUNTY, UTAH,
Respondents-Intervenors-Appellees.

;)
;
]

Cause No. C/025/0005

Agency Docket No.
2009-019

PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
On Appeal from the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
Steven Alder, Esq.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
1594 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
steveal der(i£utah. gov
Mike Johnson
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERALS' OFFICE
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
mikeiohnson(a),utah.KOV

Stephen H.M.Bloch #7813
SOUTHERN UTAH
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 486-3161
stevefcftsuwa.org

Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees

Sharon Buccino, pro hac vice
NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL
1152 15th Street, NW, Suite 300
Telephone: (202) 289-6868
sbuccino(a)nrdc.org

Denise Dragoo
James P. Allen
SNELL & WILMER, LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Walton Morris, pro hac vice
MORRIS LAW OFFICE, p J L E D
P.C.
!9 0 1 Pheasant L £ ? H A P P E L U T E COURTS

N0VH20H

Telephone: (801) 257-1900
ddragoo(ajswlaw.com
jallcnfeswlaw.com

Charlottesville, VA 22901
Telephone: (434) 293-6616
wmorris(g)charlottesville.net

Bennett E. Bayer, pro hac vice
LANDRUM & SHOUSE, LLP
106 West Vine Street, Suite 800
Lexington, KY 40507
Telephone: (859) 255-2424
bbaver@landsrumshouse.com

Attorneys for PettitionersAppellants

William L. Bernard
Jim R. Scarth
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
76 North Main Street
Kanab,UT 84741
mackeybridgetfehotmail.com
Attorneys for Respondents-Intervenors-Appellees

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB,
et al.,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
Appeal No. 20100969-SC
DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING and
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
Respondents-Appellees, and

ALTON COAL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and
KANE COUNTY, UTAH,
Respondents-Intervenors-Appellees.

Agency Docket No.
2009-019
Cause No. C/025/0005

PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
Steven Alder, Esq.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
1594 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
stevealdcr(«N;utah. gov
Mike Johnson
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERALS' OFFICE
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
mikeiohnsonfr£utah.gov

Stephen H.M. Bloch #7813
SOUTHERN UTAH
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 486-3161
stevcfolsuwa.org

Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees

Sharon Buccino, pro hac vice
NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL
1152 15th Street, NW, Suite 300
Telephone: (202) 289-6868
sbuccino(q) nrdc.org

Denise Dragoo
James P. Allen
SNELL & WILMER, LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Walton Morris, pro hac vice
MORRIS LAW OFFICE,
P.C.
1901 Pheasant Lane

Telephone: (801) 257-1900
ddra goofa^swlaw.com
uallcn@swlaw.com

Charlottesville, VA 22901
Telephone: (434) 293-6616
wmorris(66'charlottesville.Qet

Bennett E. Bayer, pro hac vice
LANDRUM & SHOUSE, LLP
106 West Vine Street, Suite 800
Lexington, KY 40507
Telephone: (859) 255-2424
bbayer@landbrumshouse.com

Attorneys for PettitionersAppellants

William L. Bernard
Jim R. Scarth
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
76 North Main Street
Kanab,UT 84741
mackeybndgetfa Jhotmad.com
Attorneys for Respondents-Intervenors-Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

3

I.

II.

III.

A.

B.

Neither the Division Nor the Board Have Discretion to
Ignore or Avoid the Mandatory, Non-Discretionary
Duties At Issue in This Appeal

3

As a Matter of Both Utah and Federal Law, the
Coal Act and Its Implementing Regulations Must
Be Interpreted in Accordance with SMCRA's
Legislative History and Federal Regulatory Preambles

5

The Board's Interpretation of Utah's Cultural/ Historic
Resource Review Requirements for New Coal Mines Ignores
Mandatory Pre-approval Duties in Utah Law
8
The Division Must Document Analysis of an Adjacent
Area and it Did Not

8

The Division Must Obtain the Concurrence of the State
Historic Preservation Officer in the Analysis of an
Adjacent Area and it Did Not
12

IV.

The Appellees Have Failed to Demonstrate That the Board's
Findings and Conclusions on the CHIA Issue Are Adequate
or That the Board Correctly Affirmed the Division's
Material Damage Finding
15

V.

The Appellees Have Failed to Show that ACD's Monitoring
Plan Describes How Data May Be Used to Determine the
Hydrologic Impact of ACD's Mine
22

CONCLUSION

25

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bragg v. West Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001)

7

Brown v. Red River Coal Co., 373 S.E.2d 609 (Va. App. 1988)

6, 7

Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n., 636 P.2d 1047
(Utah 1981)
16
Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co., 197 W.Va. 375, 475 S.E.2d 467
(W.Va., 1996)

6

UTAH STATUES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 9-8-404

2, 8,9

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§40-10-1

3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§40-10-2(1)

6

UTAH CODE ANN.

§40-10-11(2)

2

UTAH CODES
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.

645-100-200

11

UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.

645-300-133

2,8,10,12

UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.

645-301-411

8,10,12,13

UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.

645-301-731.211 and-731.222

2,23

FEDERAL STATUES
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328

1

30 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3)

6

30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)

19
ii

FEDERAL REGULATIONS
30 C.F.R. § 731.14(c)(2)

22

30 C.F.R. § 733.11

3, 6

30 C.F.R. §773.15(e)

19

OTHER AUTHORITIES
73 Fed. Reg. 78,977 (Dec. 24,2008)

19

H.R. Rep. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977)

1

S. Rep. No. 128, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 75 (1977)

1

iii

INTRODUCTION
In their opening brief, Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Parks Conservation Association
(collectively, "Petitioners") established that the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the
Division"), in approving the coal mine permit application of Alton Coal Development, LLC
(UACD"), violated mandatory, non-discretionary duties that the Utah Legislature has enacted
to ensure effective planning of surface coal mining operations prior to permit issuance.
Petitioners pointed out that Congress and the Utah Legislature imposed these requirements
to halt the widespread damage and destruction of resources, including cultural/historic
treasures and vital water supplies, that coal mines repeatedly caused prior to enactment of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
("SMCRA"). See H.R. Rep. No. 218,95th Cong. 1st Sess. 58-59 (1977) (stating that "despite
claims from some quarters that State reclamation laws have improved so significantly that
Federal mining standards are no longer needed, the hearing record abounds with evidence
that this is simply not the case"). SMCRA is clear on the importance of planning to prevent
damage before it occurs. H.R. Rep. No. 218 at 91 (to ensure that States do not give "short
shrift" to environmental factors, SMCRA "delineates in detail the type of information
required in permit applications in section 507 and 508 and the criteria for assessing the merits
of the application in section 510"); see also S. Rep. No. 128,95th Cong. 1st Sess. 75 (1977).1

1

ACD's repeated observations that Petitioners have presented no proof of actual
harm to cultural/historic or water resources make no sense in light of SMCRA's
legislative history. Actual harm to such resources cannot be established in hearings on
challenges to permit approval decisions because the record in such cases closes upon
-l-

Turning to the specific agency action challenged in this appeal, Petitioners showed
that despite the duty to withhold approval of permit applications that do not present the full
range of information and analyses that are essential in evaluating any coal mine proposal,
UTAHCODEANN.§

40-10-1 1(2)(A)(WEST2010);UTAH ADMIN. CoDEr. 645-300-133.100

(2011), including the duty to take into account the effect of the proposed operation on
historic properties, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010); UTAH ADMIN. CODE
r. 645-300-133.600 (2011), the Division approved ACD's permit application even though it
failed to analyze the proposed mine's impacts on cultural/historic resources outside the
permit area. Petitioners also showed that despite the Division's duty to withhold permit
approval unless and until it finds that the proposed operation has been designed to prevent
"material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area," UTAH CODE. ANN.
§ 40-10-1 l(2)(c), UTAH ADMIN.

CODE

r. 645-300-133.400 (2011), the Division refused to

formulate site-specific criteria that are essential to a rational "material damage" finding.
Petitioners next showed that despite the duty to withhold permit approval unless and until
ACD's hydrologic monitoring plans describe how the data they will produce may be used
to determine the impact of the proposed mine on the hydrologic balance, UTAH ADMIN. CODE
r. 645-301-731.211 and -731.222 (2011), the Division failed to require ACD to include the
required description in its permit application. Ultimately, Petitioners established that the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the Board") unlawfully affirmed the Division's permit

issuance of a permit before commencement of operations and thus before a mine causes
any harm. The point of proceedings such as the one below is to prevent harm by ensuring
adherence to the information, analysis, and planning requirements that the Legislature has
imposed for protection of the public and the environment.
-2-

approval decision based on inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
complete failure to recognize or respect the mandatory, non-discretionary duties that govern
this case.
In response the appellees claim that the Division and the Board enjoy extremely broad
discretion in implementing Utah's federally approved state regulatory program for
implementing SMCRA - "the Coal Act and its implementing regulations," UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 40-10-1 et seq. and Utah Admin. R. 645 et seq. - discretion broad enough, in effect, to
allow the agencies to ignore or effectively re-write the unambiguous statutory and regulatory
provisions at issue. Moreover, without responding to Petitioners' citation of the duty under
30 C.F.R. § 733.11 to interpret state programs "in accordance" with SMCRA, the appellees
claim the prerogative to ignore federal interpretation of statutes and regulations that
correspond to the Utah laws at issue. Based almost entirely on these claims of broad agency
discretion and the prerogative to implement Utah's approved state regulatory program
inconsistently with the legislative history or basis and purpose statements of corresponding
Federal statutes or regulations, the appellees ask this Court to overlook the agencies' specific
failures to implement the governing Utah law as the Utah Legislature plainly intended. As
set forth below, these arguments are without merit.
ARGUMENT
L

Neither the Division Nor the Board Have Discretion to Ignore or Avoid the
Mandatory, Non-Discretionary Duties At Issue in This Appeal.
This appeal concerns the failure of the Division and the Board to withhold the

approval of ACD's permit application pending (1) full identification and analysis of
-3-

cultural/historic resources in the "adjacent area" that ACD's proposed operations might
affect, (2) a rational finding whether ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage to
the hydrologic balance outside the proposed permit area, and (3) presentation of hydrologic
monitoring plans that describe how data may be used to determine the impact of ACD's
proposed mine on the hydrologic balance. Each of these failures involves an unambiguous,
mandatory duty that the Utah Legislature or the Board has established to protect this State's
valuable resources from unnecessary damage by inadequately planned coal mining
operations, as well as to obtain and maintain primary jurisdiction to regulate surface coal
mining operations.
Where, as here, the Legislature enacts a statute that commands the Division and the
Board to withhold approval of each mining permit application unless and until it contains an
accurate and complete array of information and analyses, that command limits the discretion
that regulatory agencies generally enjoy. For example, while the Division and the Board
certainly retain discretion to determine which protective measures, if any, are appropriate
with respect to cultural or historic resources identified in a proposed mine's "adjacent area,"
they have no discretion to accept ACD's identification of such resources without also
requiring an analysis of the need for measures to protect them. Similarly, while the Division
and the Board retain discretion to determine that a permit applicant has adequately described
how hydrologic monitoring data may be used, the agencies have no discretion to approve a
permit application whose monitoring plan does not contain any such description at all.
For this reason, the appellees' reliance on general rules of agency discretion is
misplaced. Indeed, none of the case law that the appellees cite suggests that an agency's
-4-

general discretion as a regulatory authority allows it to ignore mandatory duties that an
applicable statute or regulation establish precisely for the purpose of guiding the agency's
regulatory actions.
To be sure, the Coal Act and its implementing regulations do invest the Division and
the Board with limited discretion to implement the Utah regulatory program. This appeal,
however, concerns failure by the Division and the Board to recognize that their discretion
under the Coal Act is limited by the mandatory duties that the Utah Legislature has
established in the permit approval process as part of a national effort to ensure more effective
regulation of coal mining than existed prior to SMCRA's enactment.

Those duties

unambiguously prohibit approval of permit applications that do not contain the full range of
information and pre-mining analyses that Utah's coal statutes require. For this reason, and
contrary to the appellees' exaggerated claims, the Division and the Board simply had no
discretion to approve ACD's permit application despite its failure to contain required
analyses of identified cultural/historic resources or a rational "material damage" finding, or
monitoring plans that describe how data may be used.
II.

As a Matter of Both Utah and Federal Law, the Coal Act and Its Implementing
Regulations Must Be Interpreted in Accordance with SMCRA's Legislative
History and Federal Regulatory Preambles.
Without question, the Coal Act and its implementing regulations directly govern the

evaluation and issuance of permits to conduct surface coal mining operations within the
State's borders. SMCRA and its implementing federal regulations do not directly govern that
process. Petitioners have not contended otherwise.

-5-

Nonetheless, the Utah Legislature has made clear that the primary purpose of the Coal
Act and its implementing regulations is to "to assure exclusive jurisdiction over nonfederal
lands and cooperative jurisdiction over federal lands in regard to regulation of coal mining
and reclamation operations as authorized pursuant to Public Law 95-87 [SMCRA]." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 40-10-2(1). This statement, combined with adoption of language identical
to, or not materially different from, SMCRA's text throughout the Coal Act, demonstrates
the Legislature's clear intent that the Board and the Division (collectively, "the agencies")
- and reviewing courts as well - interpret and apply Utah's coal laws in a manner that
ensures the State's continuing jurisdiction to regulate surface coal mining operations within
its borders - an authority commonly known as "primacy."
Federal law establishes the requirements for maintaining primacy. Simply put, it is
the obligation of every State with an approved program for implementing SMCRA to
"implement, administer, enforce and maintain it in accordance with the Act, this chapter and
the provisions of the approved State program." 30 C.F.R. § 733.11. A State's failure to meet
this obligation triggers the mandatory duty of the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate and
implement a Federal regulatory program for the State. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3).
The mandate of 30 C.F.R. § 733.11 requires state regulators and courts to adhere to
federal interpretation of SMCRA and its implementing regulations in construing or applying
corresponding provisions of state law. See, e.g., Brown v. Red River Coal Co., 373 S.E.2d
609, 610 (Va. App. 1988) ("Federal legislative history and interpretation must control
construction of the state law in these circumstances as a matter of simple federal
preemption"); Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co., 475 S.E.2d 467, 469 (W.Va. 1996) ("A
-6-

state regulation enacted pursuant to [West Virginia's coal law] must be read in a manner
consistent with federal regulations enacted in accordance with [SMCRA]"). Moreover, a
State's enactment of laws and regulations for the purpose of obtaining primacy makes the
obligation to adhere to federal interpretation as much a matter of state legislative intent as
federal oversight under SMCRA's "structural provisions," which remain "directly operative"
after state program approval. Brown, 373 S.E.2d at 610-11; Bragg v. West Va. Coal Ass'n,
248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Bragg").
The agencies were wrong to ignore or reject federal interpretation of corresponding
statutory and regulatory provisions in applying the Coal Act and its regulations to the issues
in this appeal. Similarly, the appellees are wrong to demand that this Court embrace
interpretations of the Coal Act and its implementing regulations that would shatter the
minimum floor of regulation that Congress enacted SMCRA to establish. See, e.g., Brief of
Respondent-[Intervenor-]Appellees ("ACD Br.") at 36-37; Brief of Respondents-Appellees
("Div./Bd. Br.") at 39. Petitioners urge the Court, as a matter of Utah law, to interpret the
pertinent provisions of the Coal Act and its implementing regulations "in accordance with"
corresponding provisions of SMCRA, its implementing federal regulations, and their
applicable legislative history and regulatory preambles.2
2

The appellees misread Bragg to imply an opposite result. Div./Bd. Br. at 13, 39;
ACD Br. at 34. Bragg held that statutes and regulations making up a federally approved
state program under SMCRA are state law rather than federal law, and thus that the
Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from suing state regulators in federal court to compel
compliance with an approved state program. 248 F.3d at 297-98. However, as Bragg
itself makes clear, the court neither considered nor decided whether States must construe
state programs in accordance with federal law. Id. at 295 (noting that SMCRA's
"structural" provisions "are not at issue in this case").
-7-

III.

The Board's Interpretation of Utah's Cultural/Historic Resource Review
Requirements for Coal Mines Ignores Mandatory Pre-approval Duties in Utah
Law.
A.

The Division Must Document Analysis of an Adjacent Area and it Did
Not.

Utah law unambiguously establishes the obligation to analyze the effects of a new
coal mine on cultural and historic resources outside the permit area. Utah regulations require
each permit applicant to describe the nature of "cultural and historic resources listed or
eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places and known archaeological sites
within the permit and adjacent areas" UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-301-411.140 (2011)
(emphasis added). Utah law imposes an explicit legal obligation on all state agencies
including the Division here to "take into account the effect.... on any historic property"
before "expending any state funds or approving any undertaking." UTAH CODE. ANN. §
9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010).
In order to ensure that the required analysis takes place before permit approval, Utah's
coal regulations prohibit the approval of a permit application unless the Division "finds, in
writing, on the basis of information set forth in the application or from information otherwise
available that is documented in the approval" that certain requirements are met. UTAH
ADMIN. CODE r. 645-3 00-13 3.100

(2011). For purposes of cultural/ historic resource review,

these findings include a determination of eligibility and effect that covers "the permit and
adjacent areas."

UTAH ADMIN. CODE

r. 645-301-411.140(2011).

Appellees improperly restrict the Division's obligation to mere identification of sites
beyond the permit area. Div./Bd. Br. at 19. The agencies argue:
-8-

This extensive effort to identify cultural resources in the vicinity of the
proposed mine resulted in maps which fully comply with the Coal Rules by
depicting all resources or sites falling with the 'permit area' and 'adjacent
area' as those terms are defined in the regulations. Nothing further is required.
Id. at 19 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This misstates the law. Something more
is required. The plain language of UTAH CODE. ANN. § 9-8-404( 1 )(a) (West 2010) requires
both identification and analysis of effects before permit approval. Identifying properties is
the first critical step, but it does not fulfill the Division's unambiguous obligation "to take
into account the effect" of the proposed coal mine before approving it. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010).
The Division did nothing to address the potential impact of ACD's proposed operation
on adjacent cultural and historic resources before permitting those operations to proceed. See
Pet. Br. at 13-14. Nothing in the Division's technical analysis addresses cultural/ historic
resources in an area adjacent to the permit area. The entire discussion of cultural and historic
resources is focused on the permit area.3 The Division did not have archeological staff of its
own, but instead relied upon consultants hired by ACD. R. 5880 at 276-77 (App. Add. Part
III, 2). These consultants divided their work into phases. Having identified the cultural and
historic resources in a large area covering both private and federal coal, ACD's consultants
focused their analysis of effects on the surface area above the private coal that ACD would

3

The absence of any discussion of adjacent area in the cultural/historic resource
section is even more glaring when compared to other sections that do include discussion
of an adjacent area. See, e.g., H. Ex. D8 at 47 (App. Add. 15) (hydrology section
discussing "adjacent area").
-9-

mine under the state permit. Phase I was limited to the permit area4 and an evaluation of
effects was completed before the Division's permit approval.3 Evaluation of the effects of
mining on the area overlying federal coal outside the permit area was to occur at a later date
if and when federal approval moved forward.6
The testimony of permit supervisor Daron Haddock at the evidentiary hearing in this
matter does not cure the absence of documentation in the permit approval of the analysis of
the mine's impact on cultural/ historic resources beyond the permit area. UTAH ADMIN.
CODE r. 645-301-411.140 (2011); id. r. 645-300-133 (2011) (prohibiting permit approval
unless Division "finds, in writing, on the basis of information set forth in the application or
from information otherwise available that is documented in the approval" that certain
requirements are met). Despite this requirement, ACD relies on Haddock's testimony
"explaining] that the Division concluded that any site located entirely beyond the permit
boundary was unlikely to be adversely impacted." ACD Br. at 20. The Division focused on
surface disturbance as "the only expected means of adverse impact" and limited its analysis

4

The archeological consultants did not include any sites wholly outside the permit
boundary in their evaluation of effect and preparation of a mitigation plan. MO AC, Data
Recovery Plan (May 23, 2008) at Figure 1. H. Ex. D14 (App. Add. 20).
5

MO AC, Cultural Resource Management Plan Draft 2 (May 23, 2008) at 3, H. Ex.
D16 (App. Add. 19) ("Phase I consists of the mitigation of seven archeological sites that
will be impacted by [ADCj's proposed Coal Hollow surface mining plan").
6

Id. ("Research would proceed to Phase II if all of the following events occur: 1)
the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] completes an EIS for the Alton Coal Tract
federal coal lease application; 2) the BLM decides to offer the Alton Coal Tract for lease;
3) the lease is offered for competitive bid; 4) Alton Coal Development, LLC
successfully acquires the lease.").
-10-

to the permit area because "surface disturbance must be confined to the permit area." Id.
(citing R. 5880 at 203:2-12,205:2-206:1). The Board subsequently adopted this rationale.
See R. 5602 f 79 (App. Add. 1) ("Because surface disturbance is the only anticipated means
of having an adverse impact on identified sites, and because surface disturbance must be
confined to the permit area, sites located some distance from the permit area will escape any
likely effect of 'coal mining and reclamation operations."). Not only did Haddock's
testimony come too late to cure the absence of appropriate documentation in the Division's
permit approval decision, the substance of his testimony is fatally inconsistent with the
fundamental requirement of the Utah rule. After all, the whole point of "addressing"
resources in an adjacent area is the recognition that the impacts of a proposed coal mine can
and often do extend beyond the area of surface disturbance on the permit area. Thus, the
agencies' view that the impact of surface disturbance never extends beyond a mine's permit
area effectively reads the applicable Utah law out of existence.
Yet another portion of the agencies' brief illustrates their misunderstanding of the
obligation to look beyond the permit area. The agencies argue that the "identification of an
adjacent area is limited by the definition of 'coal mining and reclamation operations."
Div./Bd. Br. at 24. This argument ignores a fundamental distinction made in the Division's
own regulations. "Coal mining and reclamation operations" are what must be contained in
the permit area.

UTAH ADMIN. CODE

r. 645-100-200 (2011). The adjacent area includes

something beyond that: "the area outside the permit area where a resource or resources ...
are or reasonably could be expected to be adversely impacted by proposed coal mining and
reclamation operations." Id. (emphasis added).
-11-

The Coal Act and its implementing regulations required the Division to address the
potential impact of ACD's proposed mine on cultural and historic resources adjacent to the
permit area and to document its analysis before approving ACD's permit application. The
Division failed to do either, rendering approval of the Coal Hollow Mine permit unlawful.
Accordingly, the Board erred in affirming that action.
B.

The Division Must Obtain the Concurrence of the State Historic
Preservation Officer in the Analysis of an Adjacent Area and it Did Not.

Utah's coal regulations require that a permit application for a new coal mine must
"present evidence of clearances by the SHPO [State Historic Preservation Officer]." UTAH
ADMIN. CODE

r. 645-301-411.142 (2011). The regulations impose a mandatory duty on the

Division to ensure that such clearances are complete before the permit is approved. UTAH
ADMIN. CODE

r. 645-300-133.100 (2011). As explained above, the clearances required

include an analysis of the effects of the mine in an adjacent area beyond the permit area.
Even if the Court finds the Division sufficiently analyzed an adjacent area, the agency never
presented this rationale to the SHPO. The SHPO, not the Division, has the expertise to
evaluate whether cultural and historic resources are adequately protected. By including an
explicit and mandatory requirement for "clearance" by the SHPO, Utah's coal regulations
rely on both the Division and the SHPO to ensure protection of cultural/historic resources
while permitting access to coal. Here, the Division unlawfully approved ACD's permit
application without first obtaining the SHPO's clearance of a critical piece of the
cultural/historic resource review - an analysis of the adjacent area.

-12-

Again, the agencies simply get the law wrong.

First, they argue that mere

"coordination" with the SHPO is enough. In listing the applicable legal requirements, they
include "a description of coordination with the State Historic Preservation Officer" but
ignore the additional, unambiguous requirement to "present evidence of clearances by the
SHPO." See, e.g., Div./Bd. Br. at 17; cf. UTAH

ADMIN. CODE

r. 645-301-411.142 (2011)

(emphasis added). Coordination with the SHPO is not enough - approval is required.
Second, the appellees deny the need for the SHPO to be involved at all in addressing
an adjacent area. In their brief, the Division and the Board argue that "[t]he SHPO's role
under its mandate is limited to concurrence with regard to the sites identified and the actions
proposed, and does not include concurrence in the Division's determination of the extent of
the 'adjacent area.'" Div./Bd. Br. at 23 n. 8. To the contrary, clearances the Division
received from the SHPO related to the permit area do not excuse failure to obtain clearance
related to the proposed mine's adjacent area. Evaluation of a proposed mine's effects on the
area adjacent to the permit area is a critical part of ensuring that a new mine does not
unwittingly damage Utah's irreplaceable cultural/historic resources.
In an exchange of correspondence with the Division, the SHPO noted that "I've
brought our buildings specialists, primarily Chris Hansen, in the loop. He can help you with
analysis of effects to Panguitch." H. Ex. P10. The Division's own final technical analysis
recognized the relevance of the Panguitch National Historic District to its analysis of the
proposed Coal Hollow Mine and explicitly recognized the need to address u[i]ndirect effects,
such as transportation." H. Ex. D8 (App. Add. 15) at 19. Additionally, the Division noted
the need to include "other cultural resources such as the National Register of Historic Places
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Historic District in Panguitch" as part of the affected environment. Id. Yet, the Division and
the Board approved the permit without completing the required analysis.7
Failure to obtain the SHPO's clearance regarding the analysis of an adjacent area is
not a mere paper error. Utah law explicitly requires such clearance before permit approval
to ensure analysis is completed in time to prevent damage before it occurs. Here, the
Division did no analysis whatsoever of the potential impact of numerous daily coal trucks
rumbling through the Panguitch National Historic District. The Division did nothing to
determine the baseline traffic, the amount of existing commercial traffic or the potential new
truck traffic from the mine. The Division did not appreciate that it needed to look at the
mine's effects beyond the permit area until Petitioners raised the issue in challenging
approval of ACD's permit. As a result of the Division's failure to complete this analysis,
irreparable damage may occur even though Utah law is structured to prevent it. This Court
must act to preserve the delicate balance Utah law provides for the protection of both the
State's important cultural/historic resources and the mining of coal.

7

ACD asserts that "[t]he Board found that every site lying beyond the permit
boundaries and likely to be affected by mining was evaluated by the Division and cleared
by the SHPO." ACD Br. at 20. Although the Board did make such a finding, nothing in
the record indicates that the Division discussed any sites wholly outside the permit area.
The documents speak for themselves. Nothing in what the Division sent the SHPO
seeking concurrence addressed the effects of the mine in an adjacent area. In fact, when
the Division explicitly asked the SHPO for concurrence that no adverse effects would
occur in an adjacent area, H. Ex. P5 (App. Add. 21), the SHPO did not provide it, H. Ex.
D22 (App. Add. 22).
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IV.

The Appellees Have Failed to Demonstrate That the Board's Findings and
Conclusions on the CHIA Issue Are Adequate or That the Board Correctly
Affirmed the Division's Material Damage Finding.
In their opening brief, Petitioners argued that the Division erred as a matter of law in

performing its cumulative hydrologic impact assessment ("CHIA") for ACD's mine without
formulating or applying site-specific material damage criteria as part of that process.
Petitioners cited OSM's longstanding recognition of this requirement, and they explained that
by neglecting to develop a site-specific definition of "material damage to the hydrologic
balance" based on a reasoned analysis of the ability of affected water resources to tolerate
changes that might result from ACD's mining operations, the Division failed to establish a
rational basis for determining whether ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage.
Petitioners pointed out the Division's fundamental legal error in postponing
development of a site-specific definition of material damage until after mining begins,
despite the statutory requirement to make a material damage finding prior to permit approval,
well before damage can occur. Petitioners showed that the Board affirmed the Division's
CHIA based on findings and conclusions which also fail to define "material damage to the
hydrologic balance" and, for that reason and others, fall far short of standards that this Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals have established.
In response the agencies do not even attempt to defend the adequacy of the Board's
findings or conclusions on the CHIA issue. Instead of demonstrating a rational basis for the
CHIA's pro forma material damage finding, the agencies attempt to obscure the issue before
the Court by repeatedly insisting that Petitioners' arguments are actually aimed at compelling
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the formulation of material damage criteria to serve as a basis for enforcement action after
mining is underway. Div./Bd. Br. at 26, 29, 30-31, 34, 36.
Petitioners made no such argument in their opening brief. The arguments that
Petitioners actually did make were carefully focused on the requirement to establish material
damage criteria as design standards and not as an enforcement tool. Accordingly, much of
what the Division and the Board have to say in their response brief simply has no relevance
to the CHIA issue in this appeal.8
The fact that a CHIA is a design tool only underscores the need to establish a sitespecific definition of "material damage" as part of the process. It is not possible to rationally
determine whether a proposed mine is designed to prevent "material damage" to the
hydrologic balance without first defining the conditions that would constitute "material
damage" to the water resources that the agency must protect. By the same token, effective
judicial review of the Division's finding that a proposed mine is designed to prevent material
hydrologic damage requires the agency to define the "material damage" standards it applied
in reaching its conclusion concerning the proposed mine's hydrologic design. See Mountain
States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Cornm'n., 636 P.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Utah 1981).
Here, in postponing the definition of site-specific material damage criteria until after the
commencement of mining operations, the Division revealed that its statutorily required

8

To be clear on the point, Petitioners agree that the CHIA process, and the
formulation of material damage criteria, must focus solely on the adequacy of a proposed
mine's hydrologic design. Debate over whether, how, or to what extent material damage
criteria may be used in an enforcement context after commencement of mining operations
is thus irrelevant in evaluating the adequacy of a CHIA.
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"material damage" finding was, in fact, a pro forma statement unsupported by rational
analysis of the ability of potentially affected water resources to sustain changes that ACD's
mining operations might cause.
The agencies' assertion that the "threshold indicators" identified in the Division's
CHIA meet the description of "material damage criteria" that, according to OSM's CHIA
Guidance Document, a regulatory authority "must have and must include in the assessment
report," see Div./Bd. Br. at 29, H. Ex. D-26 at IV-22, does not square with the description of
"material damage criteria" that OSM provides in the same document. The CHIA Guidance
Document states that "material damage criteria" for any particular CHIA are "a set of sitespecific values for selected parameters used to measure the material damage." Id. The
document goes on to say that "[t]he material damage criteria, of course, cannot require less
than the existing laws, standards or regulations," id., thus indicating that, at a minimum, a
regulatory authority must include as material damage criteria each water quantity or quality
standard by which the law protects water resources that a proposed mine may impair.
In marked contrast, the "threshold indicators" identified in the Division's CHIA do
not themselves "measure" or define material damage. Instead, they merely serve as flags
meant only to prompt the development of material damage criteria after mining is already
underway. H. Ex. D-23 at 39-41 (making "evaluation for material damage" contingent on
excursions from indicator parameter levels after commencement of mining); see also R. 5883
at 559-60, 603-04, 655-56.9
9

By failing to adopt any material damage criteria for ACD's mine, the Board and
Division have forestalled debate on what the applicable criteria should be. As framed by
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Again, the fundamental error in the Division's performance of the CHIA for ACD's
mine is the agency's postponement of a site-specific definition of "material damage" until
after mining begins. The agencies attempt to excuse this failure on the ground that
conditions observed after the commencement of mining may require refinement of any sitespecific "material damage" definition developed during the CHIA process. Div./Bd. Br. at
29-30. This is nonsense. The possibility that the Division may need to refine its site-specific
definition of "material damage" after the start of mining in no way diminishes the need to set
"material damage" criteria during the CHIA process in order to make and support a rational
"material damage" finding prior to issuance of a mining permit, as the statutes, regulations,
and OSM guidance expressly require.
The agencies erroneously assert that OSM and other courts have rejected Petitioners'
arguments on the CHIA issue in this case. Div./Bd. Br. at 31-33. As Petitioners stated in
their opening brief, OSM has repeatedly stated that regulatory authorities must develop some
sort of material damage criteria in the process of making and supporting the statutorily
required "material damage" finding concerning a proposed mine's hydrologic design. Pet.
Br. at 20-22 & n.4.
The debate elsewhere in recent rulemaking and litigation on this point does not
question whether the development of some material damage criteria is required in the CHIA
process. Indeed, so far as Petitioners are aware, the Utah agencies are alone in contesting
that proposition.

the agencies' decisions, the issue here is whether development of any material damage
criteria is a necessary part of the CHIA process.
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Instead, the debate elsewhere is whether the material damage criteria that a regulatory
authority does select must, at a minimum, include all water quantity and quality standards
that the Clean Water Act and other laws have established. See 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). By
refusing to establish any material damage criteria in performing or affirming the CHIA for
ACD's proposed mine, the Division and the Board have precluded Petitioners from raising
that issue in this appeal. Accordingly, the appellees' claim that OSM's approval of West
Virginia's 2008 program amendments or the district court's opinion affirming that decision
somehow reject Petitioners' arguments in this appeal is plainly incorrect.10
To the contrary, OSM's rulemaking on the amendments to the CHIA provisions of
West Virginia's state program strongly supports Petitioners' arguments in this appeal.
See Pet. Br. at 21. OSM made clear that its approval of West Virginia's new material
damage criteria was based on "the understanding that the State will determine on a case-bycase basis meaningful objective material damage criteria in order to make the finding
regarding material damage required by 30 CFR 773.15(e)." 73 Fed. Reg. 78,977 (Dec. 24,
2008). The agencies did not follow that mandate here. Indeed, despite Petitioners' citation
to this statement, the agencies fail even to acknowledge the principle, much less explain why
it does not demand reversal of their CHIA finding for ACD's mine.
The agencies' restatement of the CHIA issue as whether "the Division's CHIA set
adequate thresholds or criteria to indicate to the Division whether the hydrologic balance in
the area surrounding the mine is being negatively affected and necessitates further
10

The district court's judgment is currently before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument is scheduled for December 6, 2011.
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investigation," Div./Bd. Br. at 34, only highlights the agencies' misunderstanding of their
mission. The point of performing a CHIA is not to establish criteria that trigger "further
investigation" after mining begins and after the surrounding area becomes "negatively
affected." The CHIA process is meant to determine, based on material damage criteria
formulated prior to the onset of mining, whether a proposed mine has been designed to
prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance in the first place. An agency simply
cannot accomplish that mission by deferring the definition of "material damage" until after
mining begins.
ACD defends the CHIA by arguing that the "threshold indicators" that the Division
identified are actually "flexible material damage criteria" which the agency used to make a
rational decision on the hydrologic design of ACD's mine. ACD Br. at 31-32 & n. 14, 37.
This position, however, is fatally inconsistent with the CHIA's own description of the role
of the "threshold indicators" and with the Division's clear postponement of material damage
analysis until after commencement of mining. Moreover, ACD fails to explain how the
Division might have used "flexible" material damage criteria to make a firm decision on the
hydrologic design of the Coal Hollow Mine. Instead, ACD points out that it designed the
mine to have "zero discharge" of runoff within the mine site and seems to contend that this
feature of its proposal negates the need to establish material damage criteria. ACD Br. at 33.
The problem with ACD's argument is two-fold. First, the Division recognized that
ACD's zero discharge design was not sufficient reason to abandon the CHIA process and
declare, on that basis alone, that ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage outside
the permit area. Instead of relying on ACD's zero-discharge plan, the Division obviously
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perceived the need to make a material damage determination based on other factors, and it
proceeded to do so. H. Ex. 23 at 44 (noting that, despite the zero discharge plan, protective
measures and analyses remain appropriate). Second, ACD's zero-discharge design does not
speak at all to the likely effect of its operations on ground water resources in the area or to
the effect on surface waters of post-mining ground water discharges outside the permit area.
As ACD acknowledges, ground water discharges on and to the east of its permit area have
long fed a flow of water "which usually reaches Kanab Creek," the principal surface water
resource in the area. ACD Br. at 27. Accordingly, even if the Division had relied on ACD's
"zero-discharge" design as a peremptory answer to potential surface water concerns - which
the agency clearly did not - that feature of ACD's permit application would not have
lessened the need to develop material damage criteria for ground water or to make a rational
"material damage" finding with respect to that resource.
Confronted with the failure of the Division and the Board to interpret Utah's CHIA
law in accordance with federal interpretation and guidelines, ACD argues that Utah's CHIA
requirement is unambiguous and therefore that any resort to the federal interpretive materials
that Petitioners cite is unnecessary. ACD Br. at 35. In Petitioners' view, for the reasons
stated in their opening brief and reiterated above, the Utah requirement to withhold approval
of each mining permit application unless and until the Division determines that it has been
designed to prevent material damage unambiguously requires the Division to define for each
proposed mine what constitutes "material damage to the hydrologic balance." Because ACD
interprets the same language differently, Petitioners cite OSM's regulatory preambles and
CHIA Guidance Document, in an abundance of caution, to show that the words of Utah's
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statute and regulations most certainly require development of material damage criteria as a
necessary step in making and supporting a rational determination whether a mine is designed
to prevent material damage. Because the agencies failed to satisfy this requirement, their
approval of ACD's permit application was unlawful.
V.

The Appellees Have Failed to Show that ACD's Monitoring Plan Describes How
Data May Be Used to Determine the Hydrologic Impact of ACD's Mine.
Petitioners' opening brief established that neither the section of the Coal Hollow

permit application that ACD identified as its "hydrologic monitoring plan," VII at 7-57, nor
ACD's application and related documents, taken as a whole, describes how the data that
ACD will collect during its operations may be used to determine the impact of ACD's mine
on the hydrologic balance. Pet. Br. at 36-49. In response, appellees quarrel with Petitioners'
interpretation of the data description requirement in accordance with OSM's preamble to the
rule as initially proposed. Div./Bd. Br. at 39; ACD Br. at 41-42 & n.18.11 However, they
offer no other plausible interpretation, nor do they explain why, at least so far as Petitioners
can determine, Utah did not expressly state an intention to interpret its rule differently from
the federal counterpart when it sought OSM's approval. Cf. 30 C.F.R. § 731.14(c)(2)
11

The agencies incorrectly assert that OSM's proposed data description rule "was
never adopted into the final federal rule for water monitoring plans." Div./Bd. Br. at 39.
OSM certainly did finalize its proposed hydrology rules, albeit without text that requires
"a narrative that describes how the data may be used to determine the impact, if any, of
the operation upon the hydrologic balance." Cf. ACD Br. at 41 n.18. However, because
OSM's statement of basis and purpose for the final rule neither mentions the changed text
of the data description requirement nor suggests any alteration of the policy and purpose
stated in the proposed rule's preamble, that preamble remains a reliable statement of
OSM's intent, especially where, as here, it is the only statement of agency intent. As the
only statement of OSM's intent, it necessarily governs Utah's implementation of its
identical rule.
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(requiring submission to OSM of "a section-by-section comparison of the State's law and
regulations and amendments which are in the process of enactment with the Act [SMCRA]
and this chapter [30 C.F.R. Chapter VII], explaining any differences and their legal effect").
Appellees insist nonetheless that the Board's discretion to apply the rule allows it to
rely on statements spread throughout the entire permit application, even though ACD
provided no indication that anything outside the "Water Monitoring" section was meant to
be a part of the required plan or to satisfy the data description requirement. See Div./Bd. Br.
at 41-46; ACD Br. at 40-45. Appellees fault Petitioners for presenting no witness on this
issue at hearing, but ignore entirely the fact that the appellees' own experts admitted that the
required data description is not set out expressly in ACD's permit application - thus making
it additional testimony on the issue unnecessary. See R. 5882 at 463-64, 474-75, 504, 512,
514. Finally, appellees ignore the issue actually on appeal concerning hydrologic monitoring
of Lower Robinson Creek, preferring to re-argue a related claim which Petitioners asserted
below but elected not to appeal. Scramble as they may, however, the appellees fail
throughout their arguments to identify anything in ACD's application that satisfies the
mandate to "describe how these data may be used to determine the impacts of the operation
upon the hydrologic balance." UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-3 01-731.211 and 731.222 (2011).
At best, appellees point only to identifications - located outside the application's
monitoring plan section - of various data analysis tools that ACD used to characterize the
pre-mining hydrologic balance. But they do not point to anything in these references that
establishes whether, or describes how, ACD proposes to use these tools to determine the
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impacts of its mining operations on the hydrologic balance. According to appellees, this is
to be inferred from mere mention of these tools, based on "common sense."
The short answer to that argument is that the Secretary of the Interior expressly
required a description of how data may be used to avoid the likelihood that "common sense"
would lead different individuals to infer different things about the appropriate use of
hydrologic monitoring tools. By its very nature, an express requirement to describe how
something may be done cannot be satisfied by reliance on "common sense" or inferences that
a reader supposedly will draw from sources to which the author does not even refer. At a
minimum, such a description must expressly state what may be done to accomplish the end
result. In accepting inference in lieu of an express statement, the Board clearly abused
whatever discretion the regulation may afford it in evaluating the content of data descriptions
that more observant permit applicants may include in other applications.
Finally, the agencies' reliance on the language of the regulations themselves to
somehow meet the data description requirement is patent nonsense. Cf. Div./Bd. Br. at 4445. If a body of regulations imposes a requirement to describe something in a permit
application, the plain intent is to require each permit applicant to present a statement that
goes beyond whatever the regulations themselves may say on the subject. If it were
permissible to read the regulations at issue here to supply the required data description
themselves, there plainly would be no need for the data description requirement at all.
Meeting the data description mandate certainly requires something well beyond bare
reference to the language of the regulations themselves.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in their opening brief, Petitioners urge the Court to
reverse the Board's decision and grant the additional relief requested in Petitioners' opening
brief.
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